RESUMENEl presente artículo examina el análisis efectuado por La Mothe le Vayer acerca del hecho religioso y su problemática en su obra Dialogues faits à l´imitation des anciens. Desde un acusado escepticismo, presenta la religión como una construcción cultural y convencional. La filosofía, en tanto ejercicio de análisis escéptico, ofrecerá una visión de la moral y la religión alejadas por completo de toda sacralizad. Serán, sin embargo, instrumentos muy útiles para el Estado y, si se administran bien, redundarán (...) en la cohesión social y en la pax politica.PALABRAS CLAVEESCEPTICISMO, CONVENCIÓN, RAZÓN DE ESTADOABSTRACTIn this paper we examine the analysis carried out by La Mothe le Vayer of the religious matter and its problems in his work Dialogues faits à l´imitation des anciens. From a marked scepticism, he presents religion as a cultural and conventional entity. Philosophy, as an exercise of sceptical analysis, offers a view of morality and religion totally removed from any sacredness. Both are, however, very useful instruments for the State and, when well administered, beneficial to social cohesion and pax politica.KEY WORDSSCEPTICISM, CONVENTIOM, REASON OF STATE. (shrink)

Résumé — Le Dialogue sur le sujet de la divinité, publié en 1631 dans les Cinq autres Dialogues sceptiques de La Mothe Le Vayer, se nourrit d’un franc scepticisme et d’un naturalisme « à l’imitation des Anciens », et La Mothe, en disciple de Sextus, adopte une attitude « de philosophe ancien et payen in puris naturalibus ». Dans ce dialogue, axé sur le thème de la diversité des religions, émerge le fidéisme propre à La Mothe (...) et à son écriture « libertine ». S’il est difficile de voir dans ce dialogue l’expression d’un fidéisme sincère et convaincu ou la profession fidéiste d’un controversiste antiprotestant , on retrouve plutôt dans ces pages le scepticisme d’un libertin qui masque son incrédulité et ses doutes religieux par une prudente circonspection et par la soumission à l’autorité extérieure de la religion établie.— The Dialogue sur le sujet de la divinité, published by La Mothe Le Vayer in 1631 as one of the sceptical Cinq autres Dialogues, shows a scepticism and a naturalism derived from the classical philosophy : La Mothe is not only an admirer of Sextus Empiricus, but he also follows the attitude of « philosophe ancien et payen in puris naturalibus ». From this dialogue on the diversity between religions emerges the typical fideism of La Mothe and of his « libertine » writing. It is quite difficult to see in this dialogue the expression of a sincere fideism or the fideism of an antiprotestant controversist ; most probably these pages exhibit the scepticism of a free-thinker that dissimulates his disbelief and his doubts under the authority of the established religion. (shrink)

Comment les modernes ont-ils ete amenes a considerer sous un nouveau jour le probleme de la certitude et de la connaissance? L'etude proposee ici vise a mettre en evidence le role joue par la renaissance du scepticisme et a montrer comment et par quels detours le phenomene du scepticisme pyrrhonien est devenu l'apparence des modernes. Dans cette histoire, les sceptiques declares n'ont pas seul opere ce travail de reprise et de transformation: une part decisive revient aussi aux adversaires du scepticisme (...) (Campanella, Mersenne, Descartes, mais aussi Hobbes). Le renouveau sceptique ne tire pas son importance de sa seule dimension critique; par ses objections, il a joue un role majeur dans la reforme moderne de la philosophie premiere. Faire de la connaissance un rapport entre le monde interne de la representation et le monde exterieur des choses, a evidemment une origine sceptique. Mais cette conception a son histoire complexe et multiforme. Elle passe notamment par la dissolution de la doctrine aristotelicienne des species (Sanches et Campanella), par la reprise de la conception du phenomene tiree de Sextus (Montaigne et La Mothe Le Vayer), par une reflexion sur les effets destructeurs du scepticisme libertin (Descartes), mais aussi par la conjonction du relativisme de Montaigne et des resultats de la nouvelle science (Hobbes). Ainsi, en rouvrant le dossier sceptique, Bayle peut mener sa critique des presupposes de la philosophie premiere en debat a la fin du XVIIe siecle. (shrink)

Faut-il penser l'unite de - la - philosophie des Lumieres comme s'il s'agissait d'un phenomene europeen homogene? Lumieres, Aufklarung, Enlightment, Illuminismo: ces termes ne sont pas la traduction l'un de l'autre. Unifier ces pensees en leur attribuant un commun recours a l'universel a un caractere profondement problematique et peut avoir un sens ideologique et politique. Le present ouvrage, en marquant la persistance de l'argumentaire sceptique, propose, selon la formule de La Mothe Le Vayer, un Decalogue sceptique qui ne (...) se reduit pas au doute generalise: il prescrit et programme une systematicite dans l'etude de la variation des normes. Au temps des Lumieres, en effet, l'universel de toutes les normes, theoriques ou pratiques, fait reellement debat et met en question une philosophie de la lumiere naturelle et une metaphysique du moi suppose etre un point fixe. Cette critique de l'universel s'exprime dans une philosophie du sensible: Diderot etudie la figure paradoxale de l'Aveugle, Condillac erige sa statue, l'abbe de l'Epee restitue les sourds muets a la dimension de la discursivite, La Mettrie invente - Monsieur Machine - tout en invoquant une metaphysique de la tendresse, Rousseau justifie un epicurisme de la raison et un art de jouir, Hume naturalise la religion en l'articulant a des passions fondamentales, Montesquieu, attentif a la logique des histoires singulieres, demonte et compare les machines juridiques. Le pluriel des Lumieres a ete meconnu: il permet pourtant de comprendre le caractere equivoque de leur heritage aujourd'hui, entre la reprise morale d'un universalisme des normes et sa contestation dans un travail juridique et anthropologique.". (shrink)

The present study will introduce us into a new world of Chinese imagology in the 18th century in France. Different from the negative side of the “sinophobes” such as Montesquieu and François Melon, Sade built a universe of a perfect China in which all crimes were justified. Nevertheless, as a libertine, his point of view was also different from the famous “sinophiles”, La Mothe Le Vayer, Pierre Bayle, Leibniz or Voltaire, for example. China as imagined by Sade was (...) full of infanticide, murder and incest. The pictorial description he uses was largely drawn from the Jesuit literature of that time and some famous travelers’ “relation”, time of the famous theological quarrels about the ritual, easily interested Sade. But, was Sade faithful to these sources or not? Could a libertine moralize about public denunciation? By this foreign image as a mirror, what did he want to explain, taking China as an example, for his own culture? We will give the answers in this article. (shrink)

La probabilité académicienne, doctrine formulée par Carnéade, a joué un rôle capital dans l'épistémologie moderne. 1) Le pyrrhonisme dans L'Apologie de Raymond Sebond de Montaigne est surtout une réaction au probabilisme néo-académicien que se sont approprtés des apologistes huguenots ; 2) Charron et La Mothe le Vayer ne tiennent pas le probable pour la vérité parce que la probabilité est la limite anthropologique de la connaissance humaine, mais ils reconnaissent la difficulté de maintenir la suspension du jugement face (...) au probable ; 3) ce débat autour du probabilisme académicien est central dans le projet philosophique de Descartes. Academic probability, a doctrine elaborated by Carneades, played a central role in modern epistemology. 1) The pyrrhonism exhibited in Montaigne's Apology for Raymond Sebond is mainly a reaction to the neo-academic probabilism appropriated by Calvinist apologists; 2) Charron and La Mothe Le Vayer argue against taking the probable as if it were true because human cognition can attain only probable presentations but they acknowledge the difficulty of withholding assent; 3) This debate about academic probability is crucial to Descartes's philosophical project. (shrink)

No single text could be considered more important in the history of philosophy than Descartes' Meditations. This unique collection of background material to this magisterial philosophical text has been translated from the original French and Latin. The texts gathered here illustrate the kinds of principles, assumptions, and philosophical methods that were commonplace when Descartes was growing up. The selections are from: Francisco Sanches, Christopher Clavius, Pierre de la Ramee, Francisco Suárez, Pierre Charron, Eustachius a Sancto Paulo, Scipion Dupleix, Marin Mersenne, (...) Pierre Gassendi, Jean de Silhon, François de la Mothe le Vayer, Charles Sorel, and Jean-Baptiste Morin. (shrink)

This book explores how far some leading philosophers, from Montaigne to Hume, used Academic Scepticism to build their own brand of scepticism or took it as its main sceptical target. The book offers a detailed view of the main modern key figures, including Sanches, Charron, La Mothe Le Vayer, Bacon, Gassendi, Descartes, Malebranche, Pascal, Foucher, Huet, and Bayle. In addition, it provides a comprehensive assessment of the role of Academic Scepticism in Early Modern philosophy and a complete survey (...) of the period. As a whole, the book offers a basis for a new, balanced assessment of the role played by scepticism in both its forms. Since Richard Popkin's works, there has been considerable interest in the role played by Pyrrhonian Scepticism in Early Modern Philosophy. Comparatively, Academic Scepticism was much neglected by scholars, despite some scattered important contributions. Furthermore, a general assessment of the presence of Academic Scepticism in Early Modern Philosophy is lacking. This book fills the void. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Eclecticism or Skepticism? A Problem of the Early EnlightenmentMartin MulsowEclecticism has its own logic.1 According to this logic, eclecticism is an attitude which seeks to free itself from sectarian doctrines and to achieve a more objective position above all such groups. However, many revolutions end by catching their own tails, and this attitude quickly deteriorates into the definition of just another sect, taking the original argument for eclecticism with (...) it. Germany’s self-styled “eclectic” philosophy found itself in just such a self-destructive phase at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the very point at which the concept was beginning to be used much more widely, as a recent comprehensive study by Michael Albrecht has demonstrated.2 Taking Albrecht’s observations as my basis, I wish to draw upon the example provided by two thinkers and some previously neglected material to consider in greater depth a problem which characterizes a part of the eclectic movement of the early German Enlightenment: the tense relationship between eclecticism and radical skepticism.3 [End Page 465]Jakob Friedrich Reimmann, SkepticAs a young man, Jakob Friedrich Reimmann, the great scholar and historian of philosophy and scholarship, was one of the most resolutely skeptical philosophers of the early Enlightenment.4 In an anonymous contribution to the eighth volume of the Observationes selectae, which appeared in 1704, Reimmann raises the question: was Solomon a skeptic?5 The anonymity which protected this article, as it did all others which appeared in Halle’s periodical,6 made it possible for Reimmann to experiment with unorthodox ideas, including some which had to do with the then-fashionable eclecticism. He could thus include such criticism of eclecticism as:[I]t is not so, as you say, that a distinction must be made between sectarians and eclectics. For it is possible to prove from induction that eclectics also disagree among themselves about knowledge of fundamentals, and that they do not agree among themselves any better than the clocks of a large town. What could be found wiser, what more pious, what better than the hypotheses of the Pyrrhonists?7Contemporary eclecticism, he asserted, was nothing other than a reproduction of the various individual sects because its own arguments mirrored their fundamental differences. Reimmann’s risky suggestion was that this eclecticism should be replaced by a pyrrhonism which would be better able to fulfil the original intentions of the “eclectic” philosophers. [End Page 466]Reimmann’s article has a somewhat cryptic relationship to Joachim Lange’s Medicina Mentis of 1704.8 Reimmann replies to this work without referring to it explicitly. Lange had written a history of philosophy as a history of corruption (a historia philomoriae, of the love of madness), according to which philosophy could only become blinder when, after the fall of Adam and the loss of Old Testament wisdom, it moved away from its origin. This argument was combined with an eclectic psychological logic in the style of Buddeus and Poiret. Reimmann is revenging himself for the “collubus,” that is, for Lange’s twisting of the ideas which Reimmann had discussed with him in confidence to portray them falsely as godless. The tensions between Thomasius and Lange, which increased after 1702, may also have played a role in the background. It is possible here to see the close contact and discussions which preceded the publication of books in Halle. From the safety of his anonymity Reimmann responds that it is ridiculous to try to sell the patriarchs as philosophers, but that, if one must do so, then Solomon can only be seen as a skeptic, if not a pyrrhonist. French libertines had already shocked the church with this assertion at the beginning of the seventeenth century,9 and it is significant that this tendency [End Page 467] reappears in the midst of the eclecticism of the early Enlightenment. Reimmann cites La Mothe le Vayer extensively.It seems logical, then, that Reimmann should have taken a critical position against Thomasian eclecticism as early as 1697 in his Schediasma philosophicum de Logices Aristotelicae, Rameae, Cartesianae & Electivae insufficientia.10 With Johann Jakob von Ryssel, a student of Thomasius, Reimmann develops the concept of “eclectic doubt”; his growing experience... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Chinese and Indian Ways of Thinking in Early Modern European Philosophy: The Reception and the Exclusion by Selusi AmbrogioCatherine König-Pralong (bio)Chinese and Indian Ways of Thinking in Early Modern European Philosophy: The Reception and the Exclusion. By Selusi Ambrogio. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020. How Modern Historians of Philosophy Drew Their World MapsIn his latest book, Chinese and Indian Ways of Thinking in Early Modern European Philosophy: The Reception (...) and the Exclusion, Selusi Ambrogio presents an extensive survey of how Indian and Chinese traditions were conceived of and staged in modern European historiography. This study, which surpasses in detail and scope other works devoted to the same topic,1 reconstructs 150 years of philosophical historiography. Otto van Heurn's Barbaricae philosophiae antiquitatum libri duo (published in 1600) included for the first time contemporary and ancient Indian thinkers in the philosophical doxography; at the other end of the time span considered, Jacob Brucker's Historia critica philosophiae (1744) sanctioned the exclusion of Chinese and Indian thinkers by means of a detailed criticism of their pseudo-philosophies. Moreover, Ambrogio makes the choice to focus on the history of philosophy, unlike Étiemble, for example,2 who was interested in philosophy in a broad sense—academic and non-academic—as well as in travel accounts, the writings of the Jesuits, and those of their opponents, among other sources. According to Ambrogio, the histories of philosophy were more representative of "the common European understanding of these civilizations," since they "were not openly written for controversialist aims" (p. 2). Even though one may wonder whether defining philosophy ("what philosophy is and its role"—ibid.) and legitimizing its scholarly practice is a less political or less polemical undertaking than pamphlets, letters, and philosophical essays,3 it is probably true that philosophical historiography produced an effect of objectification or an appearance of neutrality.The author's main thesis is that the exclusion of all non-Greeks or non-Europeans from the history of philosophy does not date from the nineteenth century and Hegel, as is generally thought, but precisely from the moment when Indian and Chinese "civilizations" were considered by historians of philosophy and included in the philosophical historiography: from the beginning of the seventeenth century onwards (p. 3). Applying a segregationist model, modern historians of philosophy developed a dialectic of [End Page 203] identification—the author speaks of "reception"—and exclusion. They defined the European philosophical mind by demarcating it from other ways of thinking, which they situated in place and time on a civilizational world map. Encompassing the world from Europe produced in return processes of definition and situation. Philosophy was established in a territory and identified with a "culture" or "mind" that began to think itself in relation to the rest of the world under the name of Europe.4I will discuss Ambrogio's remarkable work in three moments. First, I will develop some particularly interesting conclusions drawn from the study; namely, they address periodization, the production of cultural categories, and the valorization of theory. I will then discuss the main thesis as well as some problematic issues, before concluding on the subject of a world absent from Ambrogio's book, the Near and Middle East.I. Logic of Time and Cultural TerritorializationAmbrogio's book is composed of three parts that address three successive historiographical models. First, the "perennialist universalism" (p. 57)—represented by, among others, Otto van Heurn, Thomas Burnet, Isaac Vossius, François Bernier, Georg Horn, and François de la Mothe le Vayer—included ancient India and then China in the "prisca theologia"; on the other hand, it described contemporary Indian and Chinese thinkers as "barbarian" philosophers. In this constellation, Buddhism began to function as the negative part of Oriental thought. According to the Jesuits, it had polluted and corrupted the original Chinese wisdom, often identified with Confucianism.The second model constructed an "Atheistic Asia," which was used either as a positive anthropological image (for example in Pierre Bayle), or as a negative foil for Lutheran philosophy and theology (for example in Johann Franz Buddeus). In the pages he dedicates to these endeavors, Ambrogio often moves away from philosophical doxography, represented by André-Fran... (shrink)

On trouve sous la plume de Bayle des rapprochements étonnants qu’il théorise lui-même comme un art de faire de « belles applications » ; nous nous interrogeons sur l’affinité qu’il décèle entre épicurisme et augustinisme et proposons de réévaluer sous cet angle la portée de la thèse baylienne de l’athée vertueux par rapport à la thèse de la vertu des païens défendue par La Mothe Le Vayer.

This book is the first systematic account of Pierre Charron's influence among the major French philosophers in the period (1601-1662). It shows that Charron's Wisdom was one of the main sources of inspiration of Pierre Gassendi's first published book, the Exercitationes adversus aristoteleos. It sheds new light on La Mothe Le Vayer, who is usually viewed as a major free thinker. By showing that he was a follower of Charron, La Mothe emerges neither as a skeptical apologist (...) nor as a disguised libertine, as combatting superstition but not as irreligious. The book shows the close presence of Charron in the preambles of Descartes' philosophy and that the cogito is mainly based on the moral Academic self-assurance of Charron's wise man. This interpretation reverses the standard view of Descartes' relation to skepticism. Once this skepticism is recognized to be Charron's Academic one, it is seen not as the target but as the source of the cogito. Pascal is the last major philosopher for whom Charron's wisdom is crucially relevant. Montaigne and Descartes influenced, respectively, Pascal's view of the Pyrrhonian skeptic and of the skeptical main arguments. The book shows that Charron's Academic skeptical wise man is one of the main targets of his projected apology for Christianity, since he considered him as a threat and counter-example of the kind of Christian view of human beings he believed. By restoring the historical philosophical relevance of Charron in early modern philosophy and arguing for the relevance of Academic skepticism in the period, this book opens a new research program to early modern scholars and will be valuable for those interested in the history of philosophy, French literature and religion. (shrink)

São examinadas as relações pessoais e filosóficas do cético francês da segunda metade do século XVII, Pierre-Daniel Huet, com os principais filósofos seus contemporâneos que apresentaram perspectivas céticas: François de La Mothe le Vayer, Blaise Pascal, Simon Foucher e Pierre Bayle. A longa trajetória intelectual de Huet, aqui resumida do ponto de vista de sua relação com estes filósofos, ilumina a origem da configuração do que é hoje conhecido como ceticismo moderno ou cartesiano. AbstractThe paper is about the (...) personal and philosophical connections between the French skeptic of the second half of the 17th century Pierre-Daniel Huet and the main philosophers who held skeptical views at his time: François de la Mothe Le Vayer, Blaise Pascal, Simon Foucher and Pierre Bayle. Huet’s long intellectual life, abridged in the paper from the point of view of his relationship with these philosophers, sheds light on the origin of the epistemological position known today as modern or Cartesian skepticism. (shrink)

Plato -- Pyrrho -- The academics -- Sextus empiricus -- Augustine -- Erasmus -- Gianfrancesco Pico -- Hervet -- Montaigne -- Charron -- Sanchez -- Bacon -- Gassendi -- La Mothe le Vayer -- Descartes -- Pascal -- Glanvill -- Foucher -- Huet -- Locke -- Bayle -- Leibniz -- Crousaz -- Berkeley -- Ramsay -- Hume -- Voltaire -- Diderot -- Rousseau -- Kant -- Schulze -- Stäudlin -- Hegel -- Kierkegaard -- Nietzsche -- James -- Santayana (...) -- Shestov -- Wittgenstein -- Russell -- Popper -- Feyerabend -- Derrida -- Popkin -- Fogelin. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Return of Scepticism: From Hobbes and Descartes to BayleSébastien CharlesGianni Paganini, editor. The Return of Scepticism: From Hobbes and Descartes to Bayle. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003. Pp. xxviii + 486. Cloth, $180.00.Cette édition des actes du congrès international « The Return of Scepticism », organisé par Gianni Paganini à l'Université du Piémont-Oriental de Vercelli en mai 2000, a pour ambition de faire le point sur l'état de la (...) recherche actuelle en cherchant à cerner au mieux les implications épistémologiques et les répercussions européennes du scepticisme à la période moderne. Placés sous le patronage de Richard H. Popkin, dont un essai ouvre l'ouvrage et pave la voie à de futures recherches sur la question, les textes rassemblés par Gianni Paganini ont pour trait commun d'insister sur la prégnance du scepticisme à l'époque moderne, tout en prenant garde au fait de bien replacer chaque stratégie sceptique dans l'environnement culturel et philosophique qui fut le sien. Divisé en sept sections, l'ouvrage fournit une vue d'ensemble de la question sceptique qui s'étale sur deux siècles, le XVIIe et le XVIIIe.Dans la première section, l'accent est mis sur un aspect délaissé de l'histoire du scepticisme moderne, à savoir le traitement particulier qui lui fut réservé dans la pensée anglaise des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles. Sont abordés ici les cas de Hobbes, dont le traitement du scepticisme est pensé en relation inversée avec celui de Descartes (G. Paganini), Locke, qui tend à faire sien le principe sceptique de la limitation du savoir (G. A. J. Rogers), et les Platoniciens de Cambridge, qui s'inspirent de la méthode sceptique pour compartimenter le champ du savoir (F. Tomasoni).Dans la deuxième section, c'est la pensée continentale qui est à l'honneur, avec des textes consacrés à Descartes spécifiquement ou à La Mothe le Vayer et Descartes, avec pour objectif commun de questionner l'originalité du travail cartésien en insistant notamment sur le rôle de l'epoché chez Charron comme source possible du cogito (J. R. Maia Neto) et sur une tradition sceptique non fidéiste présente dans les œuvres de La Mothe le Vayer comme de Descartes (J.-P. Cavaillé).La troisième section évoque la prise de conscience des enjeux sceptiques chez les sectateurs et les adversaires de Descartes, qui s'accordent tous à reconnaître l'insuffisance de la réfutation du scepticisme proposée par ce dernier. Ce point fait l'unanimité tant chez les opposants à Descartes—Martin Schoock (A. Del Prete), Pierre Villemandy (C. Borghero), Pierre-Daniel Huet (T. M. Lennon), et les philosophes italiens Fardella et Doria (M. T. Marcialis)—que chez ceux qui se sont inspirés de sa philosophie—Arnauld (G. Belgioioso), Malebranche, Foucher et Desgabets (E. Scribano).La prise en compte des enjeux sceptiques aux plans politique et religieux est intégrée dans la quatrième partie au sein de laquelle sont évoquées des thématiques plurielles comme la présence du probabilisme néo-académique chez Pascal (A. McKenna), l'interprétation sceptique, voire libertine, du pouvoir et de la liberté rattachée à la théorie hobbesienne de l'état de nature chez Samuel Sorbière (L. Bianchi), ou le rapport existant entre scepticisme et tolérance (L. Simonutti).La section suivante délaisse politique et religion pour aborder le cas de la science, et de l'effet du scepticisme au niveau épistémologique. Le cas de Martín Martínez témoigne du fait que le scepticisme peut être conciliable avec une vision empiriste de la science et qu'une physique sceptique reste possible (J. C. Laursen). De même, le rapport des savants italiens comme Redi, Magalotti ou Dati à l'égard du scepticisme est évocateur de la prise de conscience des dangers que le scepticisme pose pour le domaine du démontrable (M. Torrini), ce qui vaut également pour toute théorie de la signification, dont les implications sceptiques sont patentes (G. Hassler), ou pour toute approche historique minée par des considérations pyrrhoniennes (C. Grell... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Descartes’ Meditations: Background Source Materials ed. by Roger Ariew, John Cottingham, and Tom SorellRichard A. WatsonRoger Ariew, John Cottingham, and Tom Sorell, editors. Descartes’ Meditations: Background Source Materials. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xviii + 170. Cloth, $54.95. Paper, $18.95.This volume includes primarily source materials from authors who were contemporary to Descartes’s composition of the Meditations. Thus there are no selections from Augustine, Aquinas, and Montaigne, for (...) example, who were more influential on the Meditations than some of the authors excerpted. Of course their influence is already amply documented by such scholars as Gilson and Gouhier. Probably the most important source included is Suárez, whose role is championed by Jean-Luc Marion in several works. Readers should look for the forthcoming Index Augustino-Cartèsian: Textes et Commentaire by Zbigniew Janowski (Paris: J. Vrin) for a startling challenge to the view that Descartes is Suárezian.In the volume under review, Eustachius a Sancto Paulo is of special interest because Descartes thought of refuting him item by item (but decided exposition of his own view would be adequate). In his youth Descartes had a definite interest in Petrus Ramus, although Beeckman told him his method consisted of tired old tricks. Francisco Sanches and Pierre Charron are important for their expositions of sceptical arguments and attitudes. Christopher Clavius is Descartes’s direct predecessor in mathematical analysis, and none of Descartes’s protests that he never read the man has convinced anyone. Scipion Dupleix is a fine example of how the Old Philosophy appeared to the New Philosophers, and Marin Mersenne, of course, compiled material on every subject Descartes ever had an interest in. Pierre Gassendi exercised Descartes’s ire more than any other commentator on the Meditations, and Descartes again probably read Gassendi’s continuing criticisms even though he claimed he wouldn’t. [End Page 366]Of special interest is Jean de Silhon, an old friend of Descartes’s who published a book containing a proto-cogito three years before the Meditations appeared. François de la Mothe le Vayer represents the libertine strain many detect in Descartes’s writings, while Jean-Baptiste Morin provides fodder for those who detect Descartes’s piety, although Descartes asserts that the man is an idiot for defending the immobility of the earth. Finally, Charles Sorel provides an example of the deductive mode of exposition in a text that shows that the notion of a unified science was more than Cartesian. One contemporary who was left out and should have been included was the Augustinian Guillaume Gibieuf.But overall, this is an interesting and useful collection of works Descartes doubtless knew. [End Page 367]Richard A. WatsonWashington UniversityCopyright © 1999 Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

O pensamento de Hume pode ser comparado ao dos céticos modernos em muitos aspectos. Com relação ao tópico da racionalidade dos animais, Hume parece seguir de perto a leitura de alguns céticos modernos e se afastar consideravelmente da de Descartes. Por outro lado, diferente de filósofos como Montaigne, Charron e La Mothe Le Vayer, Hume não tinha por finalidade colocar a racionalidade humana num nível próximo dos animais para apenas provar a fraqueza do intelecto diante do desconhecido, mas (...) intentava comparar o nosso modo de proceder ao do animal para avaliar, com mais precisão, as suas teorias acerca da natureza humana. Neste artigo analiso o modo como os primeiros céticos da modernidade trataram da questão da razão dos animais e o comparo com as ideias de Hume sobre o assunto, sem deixar de mencionar as contribuições de Descartes e de Pierre Bayle. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:nook REVIEWS 689 if everyone behaves as if everyone is saved the result is a world in which God could appear and not be crucified. To be sure, there is a chance of an infinite life. Pascal believed human beings are potentially infinite--as is shown by our capacity for extending our knowledge to the infinite--but we are also potentially nothing, as is shown by the fact that the person (...) never really appears in our scientific accounts. It is through God that our infinity is to be achieved, and so betting on God is also betting on ourselves in a perfectly intelligible way. This involw~s a notion of infinity not explored in any of these essays, which makes it possible to share with God without changing the divine nature (or losing ours). This sharing is a payoff which cannot be attained by.just any act. Our lives may also be endless and possessed of positive value because they are not lived in hell, but this is icing on a cake which you are supposed to eat anyhow. Still, though Pascal might have taught the authors a thing or two, he would have found this book handy for some of its new conceptual analyses and some of its classic essays. Ian Hacking's 1972 analysis of what he takes to be three different arguments in Pascal remains a good starting point and John K. Ryan's historical article of 1945 still has useful things to say about Tillotson, whose maximization-of-utility argument really was the one many commentators have taken to be Pascal's. (But Ryan misses much of the background in the combination of scepticism and fideism in Charron and La Mothe le Vayer.) Among the others Jeff Jordan does a good job on the "many gods" objections, Richard Foley's account of pragmatic grounds for belief adds some clear insights (though his account of rationality is open to some objections), and Thomas V. Morris's account of the problems of wagering and evidence will be a handy reference point. Edward F. McClennen's account of finite decision is a necessary counterpart to Sorensen's infinity paper, and Philip L. Quinn opens some of the moral issues involved in all such wagers. Finally, George Schlesinger's assessment of the subtleties of theistic argument well repays the time spent reading it. The bibliography is useful and up-to-date. The editor would probably cheerfully admit his book's shortcomings as a work in the history of philosophy, but the volume must nevertheless have a place on the bookshelf of everyone for whom these issues are central. LESI,IE ARMOUR Universityof Ottawa G. W. Leibniz. De Summa Rerum: MetaphysicalPapers, z675-76. Translated, with an Introduction and Notes, by G. H. R. Parkinson. The Yale Leibniz. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992. Pp lxiv + 145. Cloth, $37.oo. The YaleLeib,niz, under the general editorship of Daniel Garber and Robert C. Sleigh, Jr., will provide scholarly editions of Leibniz's original texts along with an English translation on facing pages. As the general editors explain in their introduction, each volume in the series will be "a collection of texts that constitute a natural unit," each will be edited and translated by a specialist who will also contribute an introduction, and 690 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER i99 5 each will include writings most of which either have not been published or, if published, have not been translated. The first volume of The Yale Leibniz, edited by G. H. R. Parkinson, is a tantalizing beginning. In it, Parkinson has collected, translated, and introduced some of the most interesting papers from the Academy edition's Series VI, Vol. 3, first published in 198o. In this volume the Academy editors have placed under the title of De Summa Return those papers which Leibniz wrote between late 1675 and December 1676 and which treat problems in the philosophy of mathematics (especially those of the infinite) and in metaphysics and philosophical theology. The papers are enormously important. Toward the end of his Paris stay (which lasted from March, 1672 to October 4, 1676) and after a breakthrough in his work on... (shrink)

This beautifully presented volume is a reprint of two series of, respectively, four and five dialogues by the French sceptical philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer, originally published about 1631. The dialogues are a sparkling display of humanist learning and make pleasant reading, although philosophically their quality is rather poor. If we say that La Mothe was a sceptic, this assertion must immediately be qualified. From the dialogue "In Defence of Scepticism," we learn that in La Mothe's (...) eyes a sceptic is a person who doubts about everything, but not unreasonably--rather he goes along with what now appears. We would perhaps call this position critical rather than sceptical. La Mothe dwells on the variety of opinions and beliefs held by different people to point out that one can hardly be totally certain in one's evaluation of what is true and what is false and of what is right or wrong. The French humanist is at his best when he describes the enormous variety of customs. He introduces numerous quotations from Greek and Latin authors as well as from the letters of missionaries in the Far East or Latin America. One admires his versatility, his command of history, and his acquaintance with philosophers and theologians. Less admirable is his satisfaction with his own sceptical epochë not to accept anything as entirely certain, except, as it seems, the dogmas of the Christian faith. (shrink)

The principal aim of Wetsel's study is to identify the potential interlocutor for whom Pascal intended his Pensées. Wetsel begins by stating his belief that, despite the fragmentary state of the Pensées, Pascal had clearly intended to revise and organize his thoughts into a "finished apology of the Christian religion". Those unfamiliar with the current state of Pascalian studies in North America will be surprised to learn how controversial is such a thesis. In this Derridian era, with its endless fascination (...) with discontinuity and fragmentation, a practically subatomic reading of the Pensées has become de rigueur. Wetsel's book is an unabashed return to the historicocritical tradition. Chapter 1 exposes the principal anti-Christian theses current in midseventeenth-century Paris, centering on the works of philosophes libertins such as La Mothe le Vayer and Gabriel Naud. More radical atheistic works, such as those of Cyrano de Bergerac, are also discussed at length. Wetsel attempts to demonstrate that Pascal is not addressing these libertins érudits, whose arguments against Christianity leave hardly any trace in the Pensées. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the "skeptical religion" popular in seventeenth-century France. Wetsel maintains that this deism with neo-Pelagian elements, essentially the religion of the honnête homme, is the disbelief of those whom Pascal wishes to convert. The following chapter deals with the most important of the unorthodox versions of the Genesis story advanced during the Classical period in France, the works of Isaac de la Peyrère. Wetsel does not propose that Pascal, though familiar with the Pre-Adamite theory of La Peyrère, intended a specific refutation of this author. Rather he believes that a general examination of seventeenth-century heterodoxy provides the fundamental historical context essential for understanding Pascal's defense of orthodoxy. (shrink)

La diffusione, la presenza, la lettura di Francis Bacon negli ambienti libertini francesi della prima metà del secolo XVII è molto più ampia di quanto non sia stato finora sottolineato: in particolare, negli ambienti libertini, oltre al Novum Organum e al De augmentis scientiarum, venivano letti e ricercati i Saggi e capitoli non secondari del De sapientia veterum e della Historia vita et mortis. La Mothe La Vayer, i fratelli Dupuy, Gassend, tra gli altri, ma anche Mersenne, Descartes, (...) Pascal conoscono e usano gli scritti del Lord Cancelliere, come dimostra la loro circolazione sia pubblica che clandestina. La critica al principio di autorità, al consensum gentium, l’importanza della storia, la riapproprazione della filosofia antica di tradizione atomistica, spesso usata in funzione antiaristotelica, l’uso delle favole antiche come ratio docendi, l’uso costante e maturo di Machiavelli e soprattutto la critica incessante alla superstizione sono tutti temi che spiegano non solo la diffusione del filosofo inglese in Franciam ma anche le molteplici e precoci traduzioni in francese delle sue opere. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Adventures of Telemachus [1699] by François de Salignac de la Mothe-FénelonJean–Michel RacaultFrançois de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon. The Adventures of Telemachus [1699]. Translated with an introduction and notes by A. J. B. Cremer. London, Anastasis Books, 2022, 419 pp. Hardbound £24.50. Paperback £15. ISBN: 9781739798314.Fénelon’s 1699 novel The Adventures of Telemachus—or more precisely, the epic poem in prose—was one of the major bestsellers in many (...) European countries for nearly two centuries. The book inspired paintings, operas, fashions, and even wallpaper motifs. It gave birth to a literary subgenre, the “archeological novel,” such as Terrasson’s Sethos (1731) or Bernardin de Saint-Pierre’s L’Arcadie (1788), in which the action is located in an antique setting. Still part of French schools’ syllabi a century ago, this book mainly owes its survival today to highly specialized academic research, stimulated from time to time when an “Agrégation” program generates new publications, papers, and conferences, as happened in 2009–10. The situation is similar in English-speaking countries, if perhaps just a bit worse: new editions are scarce and generally based more or less on revised versions of eighteenth-century translations, such as those editions by John Hawkesworth’s (1768) or Tobias Smollett’s (1776).The publication by A. J. B. Cremer of an entirely new translation, featuring a close rendering of the French text into modern English and preserving the original’s formal dignity without resorting to a pastiche of the classical language, is therefore a landmark in the history of Fénelon’s reception, and in the valuation of Telemachus particularly. This edition, while intended for the general reader, includes most of what is expected of a scholarly edition. In a comparatively short introduction, the editor recalls the essential facts about the author’s background (as a descendent of high nobility) and about his ecclesiastic career, which was compromised by both his involvement in mystical spirituality (the quarrel over Quietism) and his critical attitude toward the absolutism of Louis XIV’s régime. [End Page 140]In fact, Fénelon’s appointment as Archbishop of Cambrai (1695) was a kind of exile. In 1689, however, he was appointed tutor to Louis XIV’s seven-year-old grandson, the young Duke of Burgundy, second in the line of succession to the throne after his father (though both died prematurely). Fénelon wrote for this boy The Adventures of Telemachus as an educative fiction in the tradition of the “mirrors of Princes.” Of course, such a book was not intended for publication, and when it appeared in 1699—strangely enough, in a fully legal manner and with a printing privilege—it was against Fénelon’s will and in a very faulty form, which was corrected in later editions. An editor today therefore faces solving some highly complex textual problems, and choosing between the manuscript traditions. Cremer’s translation is based upon Jacques Le Brun’s authoritative text, published in Fénelon’s Œuvres, tome II (Paris: Gallimard, “Pléiade,” 1997).1After surveying the critical reception of Telemachus, particularly in England, starting at the text’s first publication and reaching the present time, the introduction discreetly hints at an apparent trend, among some interpretations, toward Christian allegory. If the figure of Mentor obviously “represents Fénelon” in his tutorial role, Cremer notes, this character, also an incarnation of Minerva, embodies humanity and divinity simultaneously, and thus may be seen as a “Christ-figure,” with Telemachus as his disciple and Ulysses, with his pursuit of a never-ending quest, as the symbolic form of the Divine. These observations are not entirely new; they have been formulated before by various critics. The editor himself concurs with a well-known article by André Blanc that describes Fénelon’s neo-platonician turn of mind: for Fénelon there is no contradiction between Christian revelation and the pagan fables of classical mythology, which he considers prefigurations or allegories of Christianity.This interpretation is abundantly and convincingly confirmed in the editor’s annotations. While as expected the commentaries point frequently to Greco-Latin mythology or classical literary sources... (shrink)

The importance of knowledge ingovernance presents increasing pressures on thescience-society contract. A re-thinking of thenature of `knowledge policy' is required. Byexamining the changing context and processes ofthe production of knowledge, this articleexamines whether and how policy organizationscan learn to adapt to complex knowledgeenvironments.

Fénelon may be the most neglected of all the major early modern philosophers. His political masterwork was the most-read book in eighteenth-century France after the Bible, yet today even specialists rarely engage his work directly. This problem is particularly acute in the Anglophone world, for while Fénelon's works have been published in several excellent modern French editions, only the smallest fraction of his vast and influential corpus has appeared in modern English translation. This volume aims to help remedy this by (...) bringing to English-language audiences the first collection of his moral and political writings in translation. By so doing it hopes to make more widely available the riches of one of the leading voices of resistance to the absolutism of Louis XIV. Fénelon's political thought will thus be of particular interest to students and scholars of French history, as well as to those today engaged in questions of political resistance and reform. But Fénelon's reach also extends to fields well beyond politics and ethics. In the Enlightenment, Fénelon came to be celebrated not only as a humanitarian political reformer but also as a pioneering theorist of education, a prescient student of economics and international relations, and a key voice in contemporary philosophical debates-not to mention his fame as one of the seventeenth-century's most preeminent theologians and spiritualists and masters of French prose. As such, his work will be of interest to students and scholars in fields ranging from philosophy and political science to economics, education, literature, French history, and religion. (shrink)

The few studies that analyze the impact of a combined strategy of innovation and corporate social responsibility on firm performance mostly focus on financial performance. In contrast, the current study considers the simultaneous impact of technological innovations and CSR on firm growth, which provides a measure of medium-term economic performance. With a sample of 213 firms and a two-step procedure, this study reveals the differentiated effects of strategic versus responsive CSR behavior on the two technological innovation types, as well as (...) the effects of the two innovation types on growth. The findings thus indicate that firms with strategic CSR achieve growth through both their product and their process innovations. (shrink)

In this article, we attempt to shed light on how, placed by the law in a situation of identity suspension that is "impossible to bear," unaccompanied minors (UAMs) can construct themselves, caught as they are between a unique personal identity that they know they must mourn in order to be able to stay in the territory, and a projected identity, also constructed by and within the fantasy of the Other. In this context, we consider the possible scope for a relationship (...) between UAMs and social workers or volunteers, and how the understanding of the topology of the Borromean knot can be used in the training of social workers and volunteers. (shrink)

Old and Middle Assyrian sources dealing with moths Terminology Moth damage Conditions for moth proliferation Prevention Losses and reuse of infested textiles.

Extant literature suggests a positive correlation between social trust (also called generalized trust) and life satisfaction. However, the psychological pathways underlying this relationship can be complex. Using the Bayesian Mindsponge Framework (BMF), we examined the influence of social trust in a high-violence environment. Employing Bayesian analysis on a sample of 1237 adults in Cali, Colombia, we found that in a linear relationship, generalized trust is positively associated with life satisfaction. However, in a model including the interactions between trust and education (...) level as well as between trust and socioeconomic status, generalized trust is found to be negatively associated with life satisfaction. In this non-linear relationship, both education level and socioeconomic status have moderating effects against the negative association between generalized trust and life satisfaction. In other words, less educated people living in worse socioeconomic conditions are more likely to have lower life satisfaction when they have higher levels of social trust. In contrast, highly educated people living in better socioeconomic conditions are more likely to have higher life satisfaction when they have higher levels of social trust. Due to the facilitating function of trust in information processing, lowering the rigor of the filtering system in a high-violence social environment will likely put an individual at risk. Based on our findings, we suggest that policymakers should consider the impacts of social contexts when advocating for increasing social trust. We also recommend that researchers carefully examine the psychological mechanism underlying an observed association before making suggestions for policymaking. (shrink)